MIT Technology Review today published our investigation into how many people have died near the “virtual wall” of surveillance towers that the US government has installed along the US-Mexico border.
We found cases of people who walked undetected through areas surveilled by advanced, AI-enabled towers and later died nearby, where their bodies remained unnoticed for weeks or months. These cases reflect systemic flaws in the virtual wall: broken towers, algorithms that failed to detect people, and agents who simply did not respond to alerts.
This story is part of Dying on Camera, a collaboration between MIT Technology Review and Times of San Diego. Journalists in both newsrooms spent the past year examining the failures of border surveillance technology and uncovering the stories of the people who die in the borderlands.
Each of these deaths should have raised alarms inside US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) about the flaws in the agency’s surveillance network. This is particularly true for cases near the latest towers built by the defense company Anduril, which continues to win major contracts and is poised to benefit from the windfall of federal money slated for border security. The US is set to spend $1 billion to triple the size of the virtual wall by 2034.
Here are four ideas for what CBP should do next to address these failures.
1. Conduct a comprehensive audit of deaths near the virtual wall
“If I were the federal government, I would do an audit, because this feels like it’s not working.”
That was New Mexico state representative Sarah Silva’s reaction when MIT Technology Review showed her that in 2024 alone, more than 18 people had died near surveillance towers in just one small stretch of desert near her district.
An audit is necessary because, despite poring over thousands of pages of police reports and other documents about surveillance towers, we have only limited knowledge of how many towers are out there and where they’re located.
CBP does not publish a comprehensive map of its virtual wall. We instead relied on mapping work led by the nonprofit Electronic Frontier Foundation and then used satellite imagery to verify where specific towers were and approximately when they were installed.
We analyzed lots of towers—nearly 600. But that’s still far less than the 800 the government says operate today. And our estimates of when they went up are inexact. That means our tally of more than 1,050 people who have died near them is an undercount. And we don’t have a complete picture of where along the border the problem is worst.
An internal audit would not have such limitations. In theory, CBP tracks when each tower went up and when it was active. It has had the ability to audit their effectiveness—while quantifying how many people have died near them—since at least 2015, when it began installing the types of towers included in our analysis. But sources told us it has never done such an audit. Our findings make the need for one more urgent.
2. Fix the way the agency tracks migrant deaths and remains
If CBP is to analyze instances where people have died near its surveillance technology, it needs to know when and where those deaths happen. And the current system for tracking that data is beyond broken.
As we note in our methodology, there is no national agency that collects and publishes all available records on migrant deaths. We sifted through thousands of pages of records from dozens of agencies in Texas alone, and our picture is still incomplete owing to the lack of a shared protocol for documenting these deaths in public records.
Border Patrol has had its own internal system, called the Border Safety Initiative Tracking System (BSITS), in place since 2007. But it wasn’t until 2021 that national rules were established for how different sectors should enter cases into the system. The next year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that many cases still weren’t being tracked in this system, especially deaths that weren’t discovered by Border Patrol. In 2023, the GAO reported that Border Patrol has taken steps to fix that, but outside researchers consistently find the agency’s estimates to be undercounts even today.
In addition to tracking migrant deaths, CBP launched a program in 2017 to prevent them, called the Missing Migrant Program. In April 2025, the GAO found the program was improving the way it collected and tracked data about events like 911 calls and rescues. The problem, it said, was that there was no plan in place to use the data to measure whether the program was actually increasing rescues or reducing deaths, which are its primary goals. It made two recommendations for solutions, neither of which has been implemented.
3. Track cases when surveillance technology leads to an apprehension
In 2014, when the virtual wall was much smaller, the GAO suggested that Border Patrol agents log when a piece of technology helped them apprehend someone who was trying to enter the US illegally. It would take agents some extra time, but logging these assists would help Congress understand how often various surveillance technologies were leading to actual apprehensions. Once this data was collected, GAO added, the agency should measure whether its surveillance technologies were working. CBP agreed, and it started requiring agents to enter such information.
Then, in 2017, the GAO reported that the data being collected was inaccurate and unreliable; it found agents in Texas, for example, who were crediting a specific type of tower in apprehensions hundreds of times, even though no such towers existed anywhere in the state. Border Patrol again said it would improve; it agreed to train agents on the importance of collecting such information.
But years later, agents told us, it’s still not a priority. One former CBP official described the mandate as “spitting in the wind, to be honest,” and said the messy reality of apprehensions doesn’t translate into neat metrics. (The official, who requested anonymity, served during the Biden administration and wasn’t authorized to discuss sensitive issues.)
And in August 2021, more than seven years after it agreed to do so, CBP still had not produced any analysis on the towers’ effectiveness (it finished one in 2022, the GAO notes, but the results are not public).
That means the virtual wall is growing faster than anyone is assessing its impact.
4. Investigate deaths as potential surveillance failures
CBP should also examine new deaths as they occur and determine whether they happened within sight of a tower or other surveillance technology. And for those that did, the agency should determine why those people weren’t spotted sooner.
Several agents and officials told us that if Border Patrol agents come across the body of someone presumed to have died while crossing into the US, there’s no requirement to check whether that person died near surveillance infrastructure and no process for doing so. At a minimum, that means potentially valuable evidence about the death goes unexamined. It also means that migrant deaths are not routinely treated as possible failures of the virtual wall.
CBP should automatically check every migrant death against its internal database of towers and investigate those that occurred within surveillance range to determine what the system detected and whether agents responded appropriately. Agents already log GPS coordinates when they apprehend a group or encounter footprints, among other events.
Without that check, law enforcement, medical investigators, and families may never learn that someone died near a surveillance tower—and that footage of the moments leading up to the death may exist. CBP typically deletes surveillance footage from the towers after 30 days unless an internal review is opened, which usually happens only for deaths in custody. At a minimum, flagging these cases could preserve footage for those investigating the death and give families a chance to request it.
Such reviews could also expose flaws in the virtual wall itself. Consider one location we identified in New Mexico, where several people died despite being in clear sight of an advanced AI tower. They died within the span of a few months, sometimes just hundreds of feet from one another. Investigating these cases might reveal, for example, that a camera repeatedly failed to detect or identify people in a particular area, or that agents were alerted and simply never responded.
Carrying out these postmortem inquiries would be the only way to answer the question that families, researchers, and volunteers raised most frequently in our investigation into the hundreds of migrants who died near towers: Did the cameras see them, and nobody came? Or did nobody see them at all?
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