- Russia is adding antenna elements to its drones to resist jamming
- Russia already uses 16-element versions and is preparing production of 20-element ones
- Ukrainian specialists found 32-element antennas on Shahed drones during attacks on Kyiv
Russia is increasing the number of antenna elements fitted to its attack drones, making their satellite navigation systems more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare.
The upgrade complicates efforts to disrupt incoming weapons by interfering with the satellite signals they depend upon for navigation.
The navigation equipment, known as Kometa, produced by VNIIR-Progress, uses multiple receiving elements to maintain satellite connections when opposing forces transmit interference.
Russia increases antenna capacity as Ukrainian jamming becomes less effective
These components, commonly called patch antennas, help distinguish legitimate navigation signals from electronic interference, allowing drones to retain their intended flight paths.
Russia has already deployed versions containing 16 elements and is preparing manufacturing capacity for configurations containing 20 receiving elements.
However, Ukrainian specialists claim to have also identified Shahed attack drones carrying considerably larger 32-element arrangements during attacks against Kyiv.
Serhii Beskrestnov, an electronic warfare specialist advising President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on defense technology, explained how additional elements improve resistance against interference.
“The more elements, the more electronic-warfare signal sources the antenna can suppress,” Beskrestnov said.
The 32-element configuration reportedly combines two separate 16-element arrays, allowing the equipment to operate across different satellite navigation frequencies.
Russia’s Kometa systems have also appeared in Geran drones, guided aerial bombs, Iskander-M and Kinzhal missiles, alongside the newer Filin cruise missile.
Per Ukrainian intelligence, Russian defense manufacturers ordered more than 100,000 modules in different configurations, covering several categories of guided weapons.
The scale of those purchases suggests that Russia intends to distribute improved navigation protection across multiple weapon platforms.
Despite the additional protection, Ukrainian specialists claim that larger antennas do not make Russian drones completely immune to electronic warfare.
The effectiveness of each Kometa configuration depends on its antenna arrangement, receiving elements, and processing algorithms that distinguish satellite signals from interference.
After studying the 32-element antenna purchased through secondary weapons markets, Ukraine claims to have a way to jam the antenna.
“By creating two systems — one operating in the L1 band and the other covering L2/L5 — we’ll be able to jam this antenna without any problems,” said Alkhimik, commander of Ukraine’s Night Watch unit.
Another approach involves satellite spoofing, which manipulates navigation information rather than simply overwhelming legitimate signals with electronic interference.
Fly Group Ukraine has developed another countermeasure involving connected devices that transmit fabricated coordinates to approaching Russian drones.
The technique exploits their navigation systems, potentially causing onboard autopilots to redirect aircraft away from populated areas without detecting the manipulation.
“The drone continues to think it is flying toward its target, but its own autopilot, relying on the false coordinates, gradually changes course on its own and steers the craft away from cities into safe areas,” said Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi, development director at Fly Group Ukraine.
However, the effectiveness of these countermeasures against drones equipped with increasingly sophisticated navigation antennas remains uncertain, particularly as Russia continues upgrading its equipment.
If Ukrainian electronic warfare systems cannot reliably disrupt incoming drones, defending against them could require greater reliance on interceptor aircraft, specialized drones and expensive missile systems.
