- NATO’s modernization command plans to buy six portable kits that can jam GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou, plus drone control and video links
- The blackout radius is adjustable from 500 m to 11 km, and each kit must deploy in 30 minutes, run for four hours on battery, and be controllable remotely over encrypted satellite links
- The purchase is a direct response to years of Russian-blamed GPS interference over the Baltic, including the 2025 jamming of the President of the European Commission’s aircraft over Bulgaria
NATO is shopping for the ability to make satellite navigation disappear, on command, over an area the size of a small city.
The alliance’s modernization command has signaled plans to buy six portable kits that can jam satellite navigation signals and the radio links drones use for control and video, so trainers can expose ships, aircrews, and drone operators to realistic interference during exercises.
For context, NATO wants to practice fighting in the same electromagnetic fog Russia has been generating over Europe’s eastern flank for most of the past three years.
What is the NATO actually buying?
The buyer is Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, the Norfolk, Virginia, command that runs NATO’s training and modernization work. According to the notice, first the command intends to issue a request for proposals on October 26, 2026, with bids due November 30 and a resulting fixed-price contract expected on December 11
The kits are framed as training gear, but the fine print leaves the door open for much more: they could also be used in operations. The requirements read like a wish list for electronic warfare.
Each kit must be light enough for one or two people to carry, ready to use within 30 minutes, and able to operate from a ship, rigid inflatable boat, uncrewed surface vessel, vehicle, tripod, or fixed ground site. It must also be able to target all satellites at once.
The system must be able to jam all four major satellite navigation constellations, America’s GPS, Russia’s GLONASS, Europe’s Galileo, and China’s BeiDou, across multiple frequency bands simultaneously, with each band individually selectable.
Operators must be able to set the area where satellite navigation is denied anywhere from 500 meters to 11 km (6 nautical miles), in increments of no more than 500 meters. That is a jamming bubble you can expand or shrink like a volume knob.
Because an invisible wall of interference near civilian aviation is potentially a genuine hazard, vendors must supply tables predicting how far the effect will reach at altitudes up to 10,000 ft (about 3,050 m), so exercise planners can keep it clear of civilian air traffic.
The drone-killing side is more complex but equally specific: beyond satellite signals, the kits must jam drone video links in the 5 to 6 GHz band and drone control links at 400 to 500 MHz and 2 to 3 GHz, along with several cellular and other bands. That maps neatly onto how small drones actually get beaten in the field. As the notice itself explains, interfering with a drone’s navigation or control signals can push it off course, force it to hover, land, or fly home, or cut the operator’s video feed.
NATO also does not want a system that only a signals-intelligence professional can run. The requirement calls for the kit to be operated from a laptop with an interface simple enough for non-specialists, with both omnidirectional and directional antennas, at least four hours of battery operation, and the ability to be controlled remotely anywhere in the world over encrypted satellite links, with a local override and a remote shutdown.
Not just a random wishlist for a GPS jammer
This procurement does not come out of nowhere. GPS interference has shifted from a rare curiosity to daily background noise along NATO’s eastern edge. The alliance’s own notice points to the pattern, noting that jamming has become a regular problem around the Baltic Sea, where airlines and shipping have reported widespread interference that several European governments have blamed on Russia.
The most politically pointed episode came in 2025. The NATO notice recalls that an aircraft carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen lost GPS signals while approaching an airport in Bulgaria, an incident Bulgarian authorities attributed to suspected Russian interference.
An important distinction underlies all of this, and it explains why NATO wants crews to practice against the real thing rather than read about it. Jamming simply drowns the signal. Spoofing is nastier: it feeds a receiver a convincing but false position, so the crew never gets a clean warning that anything is wrong. As explained in our coverage of GNSS vulnerability, the real danger of spoofing is that the victim doesn’t know what is happening and keeps acting on false information.
NATO argues that its training and evaluation teams need equipment that can create controlled interference on demand, so crews can be watched as they detect, report, and adapt.
For an alliance that has spent three years on the receiving end of Russia’s electronic harassment, buying six suitcases that can do the same thing on cue is less about matching Moscow and more about making sure its own people are not blind when the signal drops. The kicker is obviously that the for-training component could just as easily be used aggressively by the same organization, that is, if the spec sheet holds.
